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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of a decade of civil war in Sierra
Leone (1991–2002), indicators of wellbeing
linger close to the bottom of comparative league
tables (UNDP 2009). Better local public goods1
provision is widely recognised as critical to
improving the quality of life and maintaining
political stability. The Sierra Leone government
and international donors have pinned high
expectations on recently established local
councils to improve the quality and availability of
local public goods (Government of Sierra Leone
2008; World Bank 2009b). However, there has
been very little empirical research which
investigates how local councils have provided
public goods to date, the political challenges they
have encountered, or the relative successes of the
different approaches they have adopted. This
article addresses that gap in knowledge.
The rapid decentralisation of power in Sierra
Leone in 2003–04 was legitimised by an
emerging narrative about the causes of the civil
war which characterised the centralised state’s
exclusion of the majority of Sierra Leoneans
from the political process and its failure to
provide local public goods as drivers of violent
dissent (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission 2004). Following the passage of the
Local Government Act (LGA) in March 2004 and
subsequent local elections in May 2004, 19 local
councils took office, of which five were urban
councils. The LGA outlined a programme of
political and fiscal decentralisation, according
councils overall responsibility for development in
their localities; devolving a range of ministerial
functions related to basic public goods provision;
and empowering councils to tax and spend within
certain parameters.
In this article, I investigate why some instances
of public goods provision led by local councils in
Sierra Leone succeed, while others fail. I do so
through comparison of two cases of public goods
provision2 led by a single urban council, Makeni
City Council (MCC).3 The first, a clean market,
is relatively successful, and the second, a safe
supply of meat, is less so. Both of these cases
happen to be examples of co-production of public
goods by MCC and members of interest-based
associations.4 I adopt Joshi and Moore’s
definition of co-production as ‘the provision of
public services… through a regular long-term
relationship between state agencies and
organized groups of citizens, where both make
substantial resource contributions’ (Joshi and
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Moore 2004: 31), substituting public goods for
public services. As they point out, many hybrid
arrangements captured by the concept of co-
production remain invisible to development
policymakers because they do not fit within the
standard repertoire of accepted models for public
goods provision. While inter-organisational
partnership is now widely recognised as one
strategy for providing public goods, the focus is
usually on contractual relationships between
government agencies and either private
businesses or NGOs. Co-productive relationships
between local councils and interest-based
associations are often more fluid in character,
relying on continuous negotiation rather than
contract, and can also be intensely political.
I argue that successful co-production by local
councils and interest-based associations in Sierra
Leone relies on establishing and sustaining a
pattern of reciprocal exchange. I develop three
hypotheses about the conditions under which
reciprocal exchange between local councils and
interest-based associations in Sierra Leone is
likely to occur, and co-production succeed:
(1) both parties recognise their mutual need or
dependence; (2) the structure according to which
co-productive inputs are made allows immediate
sanction for failures of reciprocity, or a third
party enforces the parties’ commitments; and
(3) local councils can take advantage of existing
regulatory mechanisms to reduce free-riding5 by
members of interest-based associations.
This article proceeds as follows. In Section 2,
I introduce the two cases of co-production led by
MCC and consider first-level explanations for
their differing degrees of success. In Sections 3
and 4, I analyse the deeper incentives/deterrents
which shape the choices made by MCC and
members of interest-based associations in the
context of these co-productive arrangements. In
Section 5, I conclude by presenting three
hypotheses about the conditions under which
successful co-production by local councils and
interest-based associations is likely to occur in
Sierra Leone.
2 Two cases of co-production of public goods
The city of Makeni is the provincial headquarters
of northern Sierra Leone with a population of
approximately 83,000 (Statistics Sierra Leone
2004) and a stronghold of support for the All
People’s Congress (APC) party which came into
power in 2007. When I arrived in Makeni in early
2009, I collected data about potential cases of
public goods provision led by Makeni City
Council (MCC) through a two-step process:
(1) preliminary interviews with local councillors;
and (2) a survey of senior representatives of
households (n=279).6 Through this process, I
identified a clean central market as a relatively
successful instance of public goods provision and
a safe supply of meat from the city’s
slaughterhouse as a relatively unsuccessful one.
Further data collected about each case through a
combination of participant observation, semi-
structured interviews and document review were
consistent with this characterisation of the cases.
The market is cleaned by MCC in cooperation
with the traders, who are represented by the
Makeni branch of the Sierra Leone Traders’
Union, known locally as the Traders’ Union (TU).
MCC collects waste, using its only rubbish truck
to ply the narrow street which runs through the
market and one or two motorised tricycles to
collect waste from the market’s periphery. The
frequency with which waste is collected in the
market fluctuates depending on the availability of
vehicles and fuel, dropping from daily to thrice
weekly between May and August 2009, but a
minimum flow of resources is always maintained
by MCC so that waste collection can continue.
MCC is heavily reliant on traders to help gather
waste for collection. Traders sweep their own
areas and prepare neat piles of waste for pick-up;
pay young men to serve as sweepers inside the
congested market buildings; and dig out clogged
gutters and clear piles of standing waste on
periodic city-wide cleaning days. They also pay
daily dues of Le200 (£0.04)7 per table or annual
licence fees which usually fall between
Le50,000–100,000 (£9.50–£19.00) to MCC, which
is used to supplement the central government
grant for waste collection. Free-riding by refusing
to contribute labour or money to the cleaning
effort appears to be low, and the TU remains
open to negotiation about the rates charged for
dues and licence fees.
MCC also cooperates with the butchers,
represented by the Butchers’ Association (BA), to
carry out supervised slaughtering of cattle at
Makeni’s slaughterhouse. When the
slaughterhouse was constructed in late 2004, it
seemed an impressive achievement – a spacious
building with generator-provided electricity,
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freezers and running water.8 Following
negotiations with MCC in early 2005, the butchers
agreed to pay a slaughtering fee of Le4,000 (£0.76)
per cow and an annual fee of Le50,000 (£9.50) per
meat stall to contribute towards the costs of
running the slaughterhouse. By June 2009, the
slaughterhouse had fallen into a state of disrepair,
the generator had broken down and not been
repaired, and the only water source available was a
small stream that ran behind the building.
Makeni’s 11 registered butchers, or more
commonly their assistants, bring their cattle to the
slaughterhouse before dawn each day, often
travelling quite long distances on foot in the
darkness. By the light of homemade kerosene
lamps, they slaughter their cattle and MCC’s
environmental health officer (EHO) inspects the
meat, holding back any parts he believes unsafe for
consumption. Non-attendance at the
slaughterhouse can be considered a form of free-
riding because those butchers who slaughter
elsewhere benefit from information about
outbreaks of cattle disease without contributing
towards the costs of surveillance. One butcher is
known to routinely slaughter outside of the
slaughterhouse, while one-third of the butchers
and assistants interviewed said they had
slaughtered a cow outside the slaughterhouse at
least once since its construction. According to the
EHO, the last time MCC’s chief administrator
(CA) tried to negotiate an increase in the
slaughtering fee with the chairman of the BA, he
was angrily rebuffed because the butchers felt that
they were paying for facilities such as electricity
and water, which were no longer being provided.
I observed three important, inter-linked
differences between these two cases of co-
production of public goods, which serve as first-
level explanations for the performance gap
between them:
z Resources. In both cases, the consistency and
quality of MCC’s inputs are affected by
constrained resource flows. Waste collection
suffers from an uneven flow of resources,
which means that the level of service
fluctuates. The slaughterhouse is being
steadily starved of resources, which means
that the level of service continually declines.
z Prioritisation. Both the mayor and the CA
informed me that MCC had decided to
concentrate on waste collection as its highest
priority. While the decision to prioritise waste
collection is not a formal one, documented in
MCC’s annual development plan, it is
explicit. MCC’s commitment to waste
collection is demonstrated by the mayor’s
personal involvement in monitoring this
activity and the presence of ongoing resources
to fund it. Evidence of the implicit decision to
neglect the slaughterhouse is provided by
MCC’s persistent failure to act on warnings
from workers and councillors about the
problems occurring there.
z Cooperation of interest-based associations. The
presence of inputs by members of co-producing
interest-based associations is essential to the
provision of a clean market and a safe supply
of meat. Free-riding by butchers appears to
present a greater threat to meat safety than
free-riding by traders does to market
cleanliness because the small size of the
butchers as a group means that the impact of
every free-rider is felt and non-attendance at
the slaughterhouse directly introduces
uninspected meat into the supply, while free-
riding through avoiding cleaning or paying
dues merely shifts a larger burden of work or
higher cost onto those that participate. At the
executive level, the relationship between MCC
and the BA has reached an impasse because of
the BA’s refusal to pay higher fees, while MCC
and the TU continue to negotiate over dues.
These first-level explanations lead to two further
questions: (1) Why did MCC decide to prioritise
waste collection in the market, and back that
decision with resources? (2) Why are the TU and
its members more willing to cooperate with
MCC than the BA and its members? I will
address these questions in Sections 3 and 4,
respectively.
3 Incentives/deterrents for MCC
3.1 External funding
Resource scarcity is one of the defining
characteristics of the broader sociopolitical
environment in which MCC operates. The
council survives predominantly on a range of
modest grants from central government, which
are backed by donor funding and ‘tied’ to specific
categories of expenditure. According to MCC’s
2008 financial statement,9 these grants amounted
to approximately Le647 million (£122,900) in
2008, making up 65 per cent of MCC’s total
recorded income of approximately Le996 million
(£189,200), while own source revenue accounted
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for only 34 per cent. In this context of overall
deprivation, one of the most powerful incentives
influencing MCC decision-making is access to
external funding.10 Senior MCC staff members
are understandably reticent to identify money as
a motivation for their actions, but there is
substantial circumstantial evidence to suggest
that MCC prioritises waste collection and
neglects the slaughterhouse because of the
relative financial gain to be had from each.
MCC receives regular injections of resources to
support waste collection in the form of a
quarterly ‘tied’ grant for solid waste management
(recorded as an annual total of approximately
Le45 million (£8,500) in 2008) and ongoing
donations of vehicles and other equipment from
foreign governments and international
organisations. More temptingly, waste collection
has the potential to attract large-scale cash
grants which MCC could manage itself, creating
opportunities for diversion of a portion of the
funds. In 2009, the mayor was alerted that over
£250,000 in World Bank funds was available for
landfill sites in four cities and would be allocated
on a first-come, first-served basis. If MCC
secured a quarter of this collective fund, the
amount received would be equivalent to
approximately 30 per cent of its annual reported
income in 2008 – a substantial prize.
Since its completion, the slaughterhouse has
offered very weak opportunities for financial
reward. It is very likely that some portion of the
original slaughterhouse budget of approximately
Le97 million (£18,400)11 was returned to MCC
staff and political representatives in the form of a
kickback from the construction contractor, as this
practice is widely considered to be routine. The
total reported income from the slaughterhouse in
2008 was approximately Le4.3 million (£820),
which was not even sufficient to cover the costs of
frontline workers and the supply of kerosene. From
the time the slaughterhouse was completed, there
has been next to no external interest in the facility,
and neither money nor equipment has been
forthcoming. MCC has not made any attempt to
fundraise for the slaughterhouse, perhaps
recognising its relative lack of saleability to donors.
When MCC receives external funding to support
waste management, it comes under pressure to
demonstrate a minimum level of results in order
to keep the money flowing. This leads MCC to
become more dependent on the traders, as the
co-productive relationship between MCC and the
traders provides a low-cost means to
demonstrate results in one of the city’s most
visible locations – the market. At the same time,
MCC has adequate resources to make sustained
contributions to the cleaning effort. Without
regular injections of external resources, MCC
lacks the capacity and the motivation to invest in
the upkeep of the slaughterhouse and allows the
facility to deteriorate.
3.2 Political capital
MCC’s decision to prioritise waste collection in
the market can also be explained by its desire to
acquire political capital with the traders, who
make up one of the most powerful economic
blocs in the city. According to MCC records,
market dues from those trading at tables totalled
approximately Le139 million (£26,400) in 2008,
14 per cent of MCC’s total recorded income and
42 per cent of MCC’s own source revenue. Aside
from the valuable income they provide for the
city, the traders have a proven capacity to disrupt
MCC. This was demonstrated during a period of
mounting tension between the TU and the post-
reform MCC, which began shortly after the 2004
local elections and culminated in the forced
resignation of the first MCC chairman12 in early
2006. I now briefly describe the main events of
this conflict in order to illustrate the character of
the relationship between MCC and the TU.
Following the May 2004 local elections, MCC
privatised dues collection in the market,
awarding the contract to the Dollar Guys, an
association of money changers, rather than the
TU. Angered by this decision, the TU’s executive
was primed to organise against the MCC
chairman when a corruption scandal broke
against him in late 2005 over the misuse of
MCC’s 2005 Local Government Development
Grant. In January 2006, the MCC chairman
ignored the efforts of his own party, the APC, to
force his resignation, and turned towards the
ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) for
support (Anonymous 2006a). In February 2006,
the city’s frustrated residents, including the
traders, engaged in a full-day strike. The SLPP
government’s resident minister for the northern
region immediately joined calls for the chairman
to stand down, leading to his resignation two days
later (Anonymous 2006b,c). The participation of
the traders was essential to the success of the
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strike because of their ability to shut down
economic activity in the city and withdraw one of
MCC’s most critical sources of income.
The TU’s struggles with MCC did not end with
the introduction of a new chairman, but rather
entered a new cycle. The TU was finally awarded
the contract for dues collection in the market in
2006, but quickly fell behind with its payments,
and came under suspicion of corruption itself.
The TU’s efforts to withdraw from its contract for
dues collection with MCC were unsuccessful, and
by December 2007, the TU’s debt had reached
almost Le13 million (£2,400). The July 2008
elections saw the introduction of a new mayor, the
third post-reform change in the political
leadership of MCC. The contract for dues
collection in the market once again returned to
the Dollar Guys. While initially MCC seemed set
to pursue an aggressive strategy against the TU
to recover its debt, proposing the possibility of
court action, later on the matter was quietly
dropped. The CA told me, ‘We need an improved
personal relationship. For a traditional Temne
man, once you take him to court, he is an enemy
for life’. This was in many ways a shrewd move,
which went some way to mend fences, but left
MCC with leverage over the TU.
In the context of the détente under way between
MCC and the TU, MCC’s decision to prioritise
cleaning of the market can be viewed as a way to
build political capital with the traders and
encourage improving relations. The traders
constitute a significant source of MCC revenue
and a substantial body of political support (or
opposition). By performing well in waste
collection, MCC can acquire political capital to
spend in securing a share of the important
economic and political resources controlled by the
traders. In 2009, MCC was arguably already using
political capital acquired through regular waste
collection to negotiate an increase in market
dues. The desire to acquire political capital with
the traders is a rather fragile incentive for MCC
action, dependent on the variable quality of
MCC’s conflict-prone relationship with the TU.
Relations between MCC and the BA have a far
more detached character. When I spoke to the
chairman of the BA in June 2009, he told me that
he had not met with the mayor at any point
during his first year in office to discuss the
slaughterhouse. The butchers make only a small
contribution to MCC revenue: their slaughtering
fees brought in less than 1 per cent of total
recorded income in 2008. While one-half of the
butchers and assistants interviewed were born in
Bombali Sebora chiefdom, two-thirds of them
identify as Fula, rather than Temne (the ethnic
majority). The local reputation of this minority
ethnic group is that they are careful to avoid
political controversy. One Fula butcher described
this cautious approach as the best way to protect
one’s property, saying, ‘You have a vehicle,
children, a wife, a business… If you have conflict,
you might lose one of those things’.
Historian Alusine Jalloh (1999) argues that
throughout the post-independence period, Fulas
have favoured a pragmatic approach to
involvement in politics which consists of
prioritising their business interests and adapting
to changing configurations of power, rather than
seeking to shape them. Jalloh finds that despite
this business-oriented approach, Fulas suffered as
a result of the transition from SLPP to APC rule
in 1967–8.13 During 16 years of SLPP rule
(1951–67), Fula merchants developed a close
relationship to the SLPP leadership, making
substantial financial contributions to the SLPP
between 1961–7 and supporting the party in the
1967 elections. Their refusal to provide similar
support for Siaka Stevens’ 1967 APC campaign
led to the harassment of Fulas during the
elections and their subsequent alienation from
the APC government. Fula attempts to negotiate
a better relationship with Stevens’ APC
government were set back after Stevens illegally
deported Freetown’s Fula chief Alhaji Bah in 1971
to face imprisonment in Guinea at the will of his
ally President Touré. In 1975, after extensive Fula
lobbying, he was eventually released and restored
to his earlier position. Despite his poor treatment
at the hands of the APC, in 1978 Alhaji Bah led a
sustained Fula mobilisation to secure protection
for Fula business interests in exchange for
financial contributions to the APC. This troubled
political history provides further justification for
a contemporary strategy of caution.
Further investigation into the political history of
Fulas in Makeni is needed for a fuller
understanding of the political dynamics of the
relationship between the predominantly Fula
butchers and MCC. However, it seems
reasonable to draw a preliminary conclusion that
the Fula butchers’ cautious profile prevents
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MCC from fearing disruptive action organised by
the butchers. Given this, the BA’s related
passivity, and the limited revenue that the
butchers bring in for MCC, it is not surprising
that MCC sees little incentive to acquire
political capital with the butchers through
exerting itself at the slaughterhouse.
4 Incentives/deterrents for members of interest-
based associations
4.1 Reciprocity
One of the main challenges to cooperation
between MCC and members of interest-based
associations is the poor legacy of local government
in Makeni, which is characterised by repeated
cycles of corruption and betrayal. Bolten argues
that the people of Makeni operate according to a
‘conflicted narrative of governance’, caught
between ‘hope and cynicism’ (Bolten 2008: 84).
The very existence of co-productive relationships
for public goods provision can be viewed as an
expression of hope by members of interest-based
associations. They reflect a desire for better
conditions in their places of work and a
willingness to cooperate with government in order
to achieve them. However, cynicism prevents
members of interest-based associations from
contributing freely to public goods provision
without direct evidence of government reciprocity.
Positive reciprocity can be defined as ‘the giving
of benefits to another in return for benefits
received’ (Molm et al. 2007: 199). Molm and her
colleagues argue that acts of positive reciprocity
convey two distinct dimensions of value to the
recipient: instrumental and symbolic. On a
symbolic level, acts of positive reciprocity build
trust and communicate appreciation for benefits
received. According to this theory, positive
reciprocal behaviour by MCC has the potential to
motivate members of interest-based associations
to contribute to public goods provision, and to
develop trust and positive regard between them.
However, reciprocity can also be negative – either
party can punish the other for denying them
benefits or behaving unfairly – communicating
disregard and eroding trust.
In general, traders are more willing to contribute
to the cleaning of the market than butchers are to
the operations of the slaughterhouse because
MCC reciprocates their efforts. There is no formal
contract which lays out the inputs that MCC and
the traders will make to the cleaning effort. The
co-productive relationship works through frequent
reciprocal exchange – the traders gather waste
and MCC collects it. If MCC fails in its obligations
to collect waste, the traders can reduce or cease
their efforts to gather it, acting individually or
collectively. Traders do not consistently impose
sanctions against MCC for poor performance, but
they have done so in some instances. Bolten (2008)
describes just such an episode of negative
reciprocity in mid-1996, when Makeni’s residents
heaped up rubbish at the market and on main
roads to protest the lack of waste collection. This
model of daily reciprocal exchange on which
cleaning of the market is based works well because
the traders do not feel vulnerable to being taken
advantage of by MCC. They have accurate
information about whether MCC is collecting
waste and a range of graduated responses at their
disposal, whether or not they choose to invoke
them every time that MCC performs poorly.
The butchers agreed to pay a slaughtering fee of
Le4,000 (£0.76) per cow and an annual fee of
Le50,000 (£9.50) per meat stall on the
understanding that MCC would provide a fully
staffed slaughterhouse facility with running
water, electricity and a refrigerator. While this
agreement requires an element of daily
exchange, it also demands that MCC makes
longer-term investments to maintain the
building and equipment. It was difficult for the
butchers to monitor whether MCC was investing
sufficiently in maintenance at first, but MCC’s
persistent failure to fix the damaged water pipes
or the broken generator sent a clear message
that they would not fulfil their agreed
commitments. The BA chairman describes this
breakdown of reciprocity:
They built the slaughterhouse, brought water,
made all the facilities, gave them to us, they
even bought us a freezer, but that was all for
one month, two months… After that, nothing.
They gave us electric light there, in the
mornings when we go to slaughter, but right
now nothing… That is finished. But any cow
that we kill over there, we pay Le4,000 per
cow, we are paying for the council, the city.
The BA chairman’s refusal to renegotiate the
slaughtering fee upward and the refusal of some
butchers to consistently slaughter at the
slaughterhouse can be interpreted as acts of
negative reciprocity.
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4.2 Regulation
Regulation through a system of rules and
sanctions is a widely recognised strategy for
reducing free-riding behaviour by making it
more costly. Ostrom defines rules as ‘shared
understandings by participants about enforced
prescriptions concerning what actions (or
outcomes) are required, prohibited or permitted’
(Ostrom 2005: 18). This definition includes
working rules derived from any source, whether
formal or informal. MCC faces two significant
challenges in regulating the traders and the
butchers to coerce them into behaving
cooperatively. First, MCC rules applying to
cleaning the market and producing safe meat are
rather fuzzy, derived from a mixture of older
legislation, established practice and recent
decisions within council meetings. The Local
Government Act empowers MCC to create its
own by-laws, but MCC had not yet done so by
September 2009. Second, MCC has limited staff
available to carry out monitoring and
enforcement activities. MCC rules regarding
cleaning of the market and slaughtering of meat
are therefore weakly enforced, usually through
intermittent imposition of sanctions. MCC is
more likely to catch extreme violations, such as
an attack on the rubbish truck, than routine
ones, such as low daily effort in gathering waste
for collection.
In the market, however, there are regulatory
systems operating independently of MCC, which
help to encourage cooperative behaviour
regarding cleaning. First, there are three market
chiefs who resolve disputes between traders and
act as monitors and trouble-shooters. The
market chiefs are approved by the paramount
chief and act under his authority, but they are
also executive members of the TU. They do not
perceive themselves to have any specific
responsibility for market cleaning, but on city-
wide cleaning days, they can be seen walking up
and down the narrow street through the market,
overseeing traders’ efforts and offering
encouragement. In this way, they create a certain
pressure to cooperate with the cleaning effort.
Second, traders regulate each other through
normative pressure. Traders are highly visible to
one another – they sell their goods in the same
spaces every day and belong to subgroups of the
TU such as the Cigarette Sellers’ Association,
each with its own chairperson. They are not only
each other’s neighbours, but each other’s
creditors, lending money or goods when needed.
If a trader does not follow rules such as sweeping
his or her area, or contributing for additional
sweepers, s/he is likely to be sanctioned by social
disapproval which could damage his or her
reputation and interrupt his or her access to
intra-group benefits. Conversations with traders
suggest that expressions of social disapproval are
usually quite mild, but for those highly
dependent on their peers, even a mild rebuke
can have a powerful influence.
Third, members of the TU executive can
regulate traders’ behaviour by withdrawing their
access to trading space. The TU chairman
described threatening to seize the tables of those
who did not clean their own areas prior to his
dispute with MCC. However, the TU executive is
likely to be supportive of MCC’s aims only when
the two bodies are aligned.
Butchers, like other traders, are highly
dependent on each other for periodic loans.
Their business is capital intensive because of the
high cost of purchasing a single cow. It is
common for butchers to purchase a cow on a
repayment basis from another butcher or a cattle
trader, or to pair up and take turns slaughtering
a cow and sharing out the meat to prevent
having to freeze too much overnight. Butchers
are therefore well positioned to apply normative
pressure on one another to attend the
slaughterhouse, but appear not to do so. Perhaps
this can be explained by the fact that non-
attendance of one butcher at the slaughterhouse
does not immediately create extra work for
another butcher. It does, however, leave the
burden of payment on those attending the
slaughterhouse, and may in the future lead to
steeper rises in slaughtering fees due to a
narrower base of fee-payers. Alternatively,
butchers’ dissatisfaction with the slaughterhouse
may make them sympathetic to free-riding as an
act of negative reciprocity.
The BA chairman does advocate to local
government on behalf of the butchers, but he is
far less active than the TU executive in this
regard. The BA’s main function seems to be
coordinating mutual support efforts to keep each
butcher operating at a profit. According to the
BA chairman, meetings of the butchers focus
mainly on current threats to profitability and the
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BA collects contributions to support any butcher
who sustains a shock to his business. The BA
chairman has passed responsibility for most of
the daily running of his butcher business onto his
sons, and appears to serve more as a senior
adviser for a group of businessmen than a
regulator. Individual butchers’ choices not to
attend the slaughterhouse seem to go relatively
unchallenged by him. Therefore even self-
regulation by the butchers’ own association is
weak, compared to that of the traders.
5 Conclusions
What can comparison of these two cases tell us
about why some instances of public goods
provision led by local councils in Sierra Leone
succeed, while others fail? My analysis suggests
that when local public goods are provided through
co-production by local councils and interest-based
associations, the dynamics of the co-productive
relationship are a critical determinant of the
quality of public goods provision. Successful co-
production appears to rely on establishing and
sustaining a pattern of reciprocal exchange
between the parties. Given the political context in
Sierra Leone, I propose three broader hypotheses
about the conditions under which a pattern of
reciprocal exchange between local councils and
interest-based associations might be sustained,
and co-production succeed.
First, co-production is more likely to succeed
when both parties recognise their mutual need
or dependence. In the cases I describe,
recognition of mutual dependence is made more
complicated by the fact that MCC appears not to
value public goods for their own sake, but rather
for the economic or political resources that can
be secured through their provision. Although
MCC cannot ensure the safety of the meat
supply without the butchers’ cooperation, MCC’s
relative indifference to achieving this outcome
means that these are insufficient grounds for it
to recognise its dependence on the butchers. The
butchers offer little in the way of revenue or
political clout to serve as an alternate basis for
MCC dependence. By contrast, MCC recognises
its dependence on the traders on three counts:
working with the traders provides a low-cost
means to demonstrate visible results of waste
collection to donors and central government;
market dues paid by traders constitute a
significant source of revenue; and the traders’
political support enables MCC to negotiate
increases in dues and forestall disruptive action.
It is the traders’ control of important economic
and political resources that facilitates the
emergence of a pattern of positive reciprocity
with MCC.
Many traders value having a clean market, which
makes it relatively straightforward for them to
recognise their dependence on MCC as a waste
collector. The butchers seem to have more
ambiguous feelings about the importance of
supervised slaughtering as a means to ensuring
the safety of the meat supply. When critical
resources such as electricity, water and a freezer
are taken away, some do not sufficiently value
the slaughterhouse to recognise their
dependence on MCC, and choose to free-ride. If
MCC were to make a concerted effort to improve
the slaughterhouse, it would need to address
these motivational challenges as well as increase
the flow of resources to the facility.
Second, given low levels of trust, co-production is
more likely to succeed when the structure
according to which co-productive inputs are
made allows immediate sanction for failures of
reciprocity, or when a third party enforces co-
producing parties’ commitments. The ease with
which MCC and the traders can sanction one
another by ceasing to contribute to the cleaning
effort gives rise to commitments on both sides
which are, in a sense, self-enforcing. In contrast,
MCC did not suffer any sanction when it failed
to uphold its commitments to the butchers. This
is indicative of weak bottom-up and top-down
oversight of MCC as a public goods provider. The
domination of a single political party which
handpicks candidates and weak ‘community’
monitoring of public goods provision leave MCC
relatively unaccountable to Makeni’s residents.
Top-down oversight of MCC is provided by a
range of actors within the finance and local
government ministries,14 but to my knowledge,
none of these actors routinely reward or punish
performance in public goods provision.15 David
Booth (see Booth, ‘Towards a Theory…’, this IDS
Bulletin) identifies the presence of ‘corporate
performance disciplines’ in provider
organisations as one of three key conditions
associated with better public goods provision by
African local governments, arguing that such
performance disciplines can be effective ‘even
when… the sociopolitical context and
professional norms retain important patrimonial
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or clientelistic features’. In the case of the
slaughterhouse, top-down pressure could have
been created by introducing a senior government
official as a third party enforcer to witness the
agreement between MC and the butchers and
impose sanctions if commitments were not
upheld, which might have helped sustain
reciprocal behaviour. The involvement of a third
party enforcer need not preclude regular
renegotiation of parties’ commitments to one
another to maintain flexibility.
Third, co-production is more likely to succeed
when local councils can take advantage of
existing regulatory mechanisms to reduce free-
riding by members of interest-based associations.
Traders in Makeni’s market (including market
chiefs and executive members of the TU)
demonstrate a capacity for and interest in self-
regulation regarding waste collection, while
butchers show little interest in enforcing
slaughtering requirements. It seems likely that
other councils will face the same challenges as
MCC in addressing free-riding or destructive
behaviour by members of interest-based
associations: the lack of a clear legal/regulatory
framework and insufficient resources for
monitoring and enforcement activities. Councils
may wish to invest in improving their capacity in
this regard, but they can also make use of other
regulatory machinery where it is available. In
doing so, they are incorporating ‘institutional
elements inherited from the past’ which are
‘problem-solving’ in the relevant context (see
Booth, ‘Introduction’, this IDS Bulletin). Citing
Avner Greif (2006), Booth suggests that
institutional elements from the past are
important to public goods provision because they
serve as low-cost, default templates for action,
enabling actors to avoid the high costs and
collective action problems involved in creating
new institutions.
Both chieftaincy and associational structures may
offer helpful regulatory machinery for councils.
The network of local sub-chiefs in Sierra Leone is
extensive and their main function is the
maintenance of public order. However, in taking
advantage of chiefs’ regulatory capacity, councils
could run the risk of enabling chiefly abuses of
power, which some argue were a significant driver
of conflict (Hanlon 2005; Richards 2005).
Tensions between councils and chiefs in some
areas also undermine possibilities for
cooperation. The potential of chiefs to serve as
supplementary regulators needs to be assessed in
the context of the locale and public good in
question. Exploitative behaviour by chiefs is likely
to be lower in urban areas where competitive
pressure from other government actors and
exposure to public scrutiny impose certain limits.
Within interest-based associations, both peers
and executive members can serve as regulators.
Leonard’s work on veterinary associations in
Africa suggests that informal self-regulation
among peers which makes opportunities for
profitable collaboration contingent on adherence
to certain standards is likely to be more
achievable than formal self-regulation based on a
system of sanctions because it is usually difficult
to find a subgroup of members willing to take on
the high costs of organising such punitive
mechanisms (Leonard 2000).
Co-productive arrangements for the provision of
local public goods are likely to be prevalent in
Sierra Leone due to weak council capacity to
provide goods independently (Joshi and Moore
2004). They deserve greater recognition by local
councils, the central government and donors as a
model of public goods provision with the
potential to deliver reasonably good outcomes
even under constrained circumstances. Joshi and
Moore (2004) argue that co-productive
arrangements are ignored because the
conceptual language to describe them has not
yet been popularised within development policy
discourse. In the context of the decentralisation
process in Sierra Leone, co-productive
arrangements are further obscured by donor
assumptions that the main challenges facing
local councils are ones of technical capacity and
access to funding, and that local associations can
best contribute to improved public goods
provision by monitoring local councils’ efforts,
rather than co-producing goods (World Bank
2009a,b). My analysis suggests that a more
empirically grounded strategy for supporting
local councils is needed, which recognises that
councils are fundamentally political actors whose
motives are likely to be power-seeking and whose
success in public goods provision is highly
context-dependent. Such a strategy would pay
greater attention to existing local institutions
that could help councils achieve the enormous
challenges with which they are tasked.
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errors are my own.
1 The classic economic definition of public
goods holds that public goods are non-
excludable (once produced, nobody can be
excluded from their benefits) and non-
rivalrous (one person’s enjoyment doesn’t
diminish another’s). In practice, few goods
meet these criteria when strictly applied, and
in this research, public goods are taken to
include the somewhat broader set of goods
and services with strong positive social
externalities which are underproduced
because of information imperfections and
thus frequently supplied by government (see
Booth’s Introduction, this IDS Bulletin).
2 I collected data about these two cases between
January and October 2009. I use the present
tense to describe the status quo at that time.
3 Prior to Makeni’s upgrade to city status in
2006, Makeni City Council was known as
Makeni Town Council. For simplicity’s sake, I
use the acronym MCC throughout to refer to
all incarnations of the post-reform council.
4 I use the term ‘interest-based association’ to
describe associations that bring together
members who play similar occupational roles
and enable collective action in their common
interest.
5 Free-riding describes the action of benefiting
from the contributions of others without
making a similar contribution.
6 I used MCC’s recently revised property
register as the sampling frame for the survey.
I drew a simple random sample of properties
from this frame. I then randomly allocated
properties as sites for either male or female
interviews. At each property, the interviewer
completed a full listing of households resident
there. S/he then identified a senior
representative of every household resident at
the property using a standard set of criteria
and interviewed him/her.
7 All currency conversions are made using an
average rate for 2009 of Le1=£0.00019.
Larger sums are rounded up to an appropriate
unit.
8 The slaughterhouse was constructed with
funds from a Local Government Development
Grant, which are intended to support
development projects designed by local
councils in consultation with their
constituents. In 2004, the first ever round of
these grants, councils were required to use the
grant money for projects that could be
completed within 100 days, in order to build
immediate trust in their capacity to deliver
public goods (Kanu 2009).
9 I obtained an unofficial electronic copy of this
document from MCC.
10 I use this term to refer to funds from central
government or from donor agencies.
11 This figure was obtained from a dataset
compiled by the World Bank’s Institutional
Reform and Capacity Building Project.
12 The position of ‘chairman’ was renamed
‘mayor’ in 2006, following Makeni’s upgrade
to city status.
13 The SLPP lost the election in March 1967, but
a series of coups and counter-coups took place
before the APC finally took office in April
1968.
14 From a local perspective, those actors most
involved in directly overseeing local councils
include the Decentralization Secretariat and
the provincial offices within the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, Local Government and Rural
Development and the Local Government
Finance Department within the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development.
15 The current phase of World Bank support for
local councils (2009–11) includes performance
bonuses for those councils who meet mutually
agreed service delivery targets (World Bank
2009b). This phase of support began after my
fieldwork was completed, so I do not have any
information about how this measure is being
implemented, or its effects.
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